Purdue University

Purdue e-Pubs
Purdue CIBER Working Papers

Krannert Graduate School of Management

1-1-2000

Heterogeneous Matching, Transferable Utility and
Labor Market Outcomes
Alain Delacroix
Purdue University

Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ciberwp
Delacroix, Alain, "Heterogeneous Matching, Transferable Utility and Labor Market Outcomes" (2000). Purdue CIBER Working Papers.
Paper 1.
http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ciberwp/1

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.

Heterogeneous Matching, Transferable Utility
and Labor Market Outcomes∗
Alain Delacroix†
Purdue University
April 2, 2001

Abstract
A model of the labor market under search frictions is developed, where participants are heterogeneous
with respect to their productivity types and the individual decision of which type of agents to match with
is endogenized. Wages are negotiated, so that all gains from trade are exploited. This has important
implications for the equilibrium outcomes. In particular, two applications are studied. It is observed that
countries with high (low) unemployment tend to exhibit low (high) wage dispersion. And there is evidence
showing that individual and Þrm characteristics have more explanatory power for the French than for the
American wage data. The model is able to replicate these two observations, underscoring the relevance of
considering matching patterns between heterogeneous agents in the diﬀerent economies. Since the model
does not feature a minimum wage, I thus provide a theory of endogenous wage compression.
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Motivation

The paper looks at how agents who diﬀer with respect to their productivities, decide to match in an
economy characterized by search frictions. When this is the case, a central question is: what matching
patterns are sustainable in equilibrium? In other terms, who matches with whom? The question is asked in
the context of a labor market, where workers are characterized by diﬀerent skill levels and Þrms by diﬀerent
technologies used. Interestingly, using this framework, it is possible to replicate two empirical regularities
observed in the U.S. and European labor markets. First, it is well documented in Bertola and Ichino (1995),
Abraham and Houseman (1995), Katz, Loveman and Blanchßower (1995), that the former is characterized by
low unemployment but high wage dispersion, and the latter by high unemployment but low wage dispersion.
Bertola and Ichino even point out the fact that within-type wage dispersion (i.e. after controlling for education
and experience) is also higher in the U.S. than in Europe. This can be explained in this model by only relying
on diﬀerent matching behaviors among heterogeneous agents. It is shown that the characteristics of the
European and American labor markets, as shaped by their respective labor market policies, as well as the
actually observed matching patterns, are consistent with equilibria generating the corresponding observations
on wage dispersion and unemployment. Second, again contrasting U.S. and European labor markets, Abowd,
Kramarz, Margolis and Troske (1998) Þnd that, accounting for observable and unobservable heterogeneity,
individual characteristics plus establishment eﬀects explain about 20% more of the annual variation in annual
wages for the French sample, as opposed to the American one. This is an observation, that can also be
explained in the context of this model. Hence, the analysis of matching patterns across countries, even
though relatively ignored, may be very relevant to the study of labor markets.

Matching models can be divided into two categories, depending on how the match payoﬀs are determined.
The Þrst one is comprised of models where non-transferable utility is assumed. In these, individuals take the
characteristics of the counterpart they consider as a potential partner as given, which determines the utility
they derive from the match. There is no possibility for any one partner to induce the other one to accept
the match by transferring some of the utility they get from the match to the other partner. Hence, a match
will take place if and only if both individuals derive suﬃcient utility from it, given these Þxed payoﬀs. This
typically results in the creation of ”classes”, where individuals only match with partners of similar character2

istics, thereby prohibiting individuals with very diﬀerent characteristics from forming a pair1 . The standard
references are Burdett and Coles (1997, 1999) who, without loss of generality, apply the non-transferability
assumption to the marriage market. The second category is comprised of models where transferable utility is
assumed: a meeting between two agents creates a local surplus, whose division between the two partners is
bargained over. Therefore, as long as there are gains from trade, the possibility to negotiate the division of
the surplus ensures that a partner can always induce the other one to accept the match, while also retaining
a positive surplus for herself. Hence, a match will take place if and only if the combined match surplus is
positive. The labor market is the prototypical application of transferable utility, since Þrms and workers can
negotiate wages to split output. The paper focuses on the transferable utility case, with heterogeneous agents.
We will see that this results in matching patterns that may be very diﬀerent from the ones observed with
non-transferable utility.

The few related papers addressing the issue of matching between heterogeneous agents with transferable
utility are Burdett and Coles (1999), Sattinger (1995), and Shimer and Smith (2000). Burdett and Coles
look at all the basic ingredients required for a general theory of partnership formation under several diﬀerent
settings: transferable utility, non-transferable utility and match speciÞc heterogeneity. Sattinger looks more
speciÞcally at the case of transferable utility and focuses on how ex-ante diﬀerences in worker quality may generate sorting externalities, as the workers’ matching patterns aﬀect the composition of the pool of unemployed
workers in equilibrium and therefore other workers’ decisions. Shimer and Smith deÞne a search equilibrium
in the case where there is a continuum of types and Þnd suﬃcient conditions for existence of equilibrium and
for the agents’ matching sets to be convex. The present model uses a framework similar to Shimer and Smith.
A matching equilibrium is deÞned and its characteristics presented. By outlining the consequences of assuming transferable utility, the model is able to account for the two observations mentioned at the beginning.
Thus, this paper is also an attempt to show that taking matching patterns between heterogeneous agents into
account, is important in explaining certain labor market outcomes.

The paper is organized as follows. A matching equilibrium is deÞned in section 2. The general characteristics of such an equilibrium are presented in section 3, emphasizing the consequences of assuming transferable
1 At

least when the individual payoﬀs are only a function of, and linear in the partner’s ”charm”.
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utility. As an illustration, the case of two productivity types is developed as well. Two applications are studied
in section 4. First, comparing U.S. and European labor markets, countries with high (low) wage dispersion
experience low (high) unemployment. The model has the property that equilibria where agents match with
a larger set of productivity types tend to result in a higher wage dispersion and lower unemployment than
equilibria where agents match with a smaller set of types. Hence, high wage dispersion can be associated
with low unemployment and low wage dispersion with high unemployment. A simulation and some empirical
evidence, consistent with the labor market policies in place, are provided to support the notion that Europe
may be exhibiting the kind of matching patterns that would result in higher unemployment and lower wage
dispersion than in the U.S. I thus provide a theory of endogenous wage compression. Second, I give evidence
on French and U.S. wage data, indicating that the combination of individual characteristics and establishment
eﬀects have more explanatory power for the French than for the American data. Again, the model can explain
this observation, when taking into account the matching patterns between heterogeneous agents. These two
applications emphasize the importance of incorporating the matching behavior of participants in the labor
market, when studying these markets across countries. Finally, section 5 concludes and presents possible
future extensions.

2

Matching equilibrium

2.1

Assumptions

The economy is composed of (i) a pool of searching agents looking for a partner to match with, and (ii)
a pool of matched agents who are producing and splitting the output of the match. Exogenous breakdowns
in the matched pool are the source of new entrants into the search pool. It implies that both the ßows in
and out of the search pool are endogenous. In addition, it is assumed that the utility is fully transferable
between agents in a match and that the wage is determined through bargaining. This simple set up is designed
to closely replicate the workings of a labor market. It is also expendable to situations very diﬀerent from
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one. The main characteristics are that heterogeneous agents are looking for partners to form a long-term
relationship, where some output is to be produced and shared (no output can be produced by a single agent).
In addition, the matches may be stochastically broken, in which case the search process has to resume.

Because of search frictions, Þnding a partner to engage in production with, is a time consuming process
and agents get to meet each other only randomly, according to a Poisson process. Consider that there are n
productivity types, pi , i ∈ {1...n} and that there is a constant total number of agents of each type in the entire
economy. There is no uncertainty about the type of the agents met. These agents are referred to as partners
(no Þrm or worker). This is purely for simplicity, since the nature of the relationship between two partners is
the same as between a worker and Þrm. There is no further search once the match is formed. Total symmetry
is needed between partners (workers or Þrms). As a result, it is assumed that both unemployment beneÞts
and vacancy posting costs are equal to zero2 . Each type has a bargaining power θ =

1
2

(in the Nash bargaining

solution). The output from a match is determined by a strictly positive, increasing and symmetric production
function. The production function will be assumed to be additive, so that all Þrms can be considered as just
a worker-job pair.

Denote by fij the output produced in a match between type pi and type pj . Hence:
∀i, j, fij = fji
∀ (i, j, k) ∈ {1...n} , j > k =⇒ fij > fik

2.2

Matching between heterogeneous agents

Denote by Ui the discounted lifetime expected value of search for an unmatched partner of type pi , and
by Mij the discounted lifetime expected value of a match to a type pi partner, when matched with a type
2 This

is not a totally innocuous assumption, though. If partners were receiving income during search, that might preclude

some equilibria, since search income would aﬀect partners’ search values. It follows that the output of certain matches might not
be large enough to compensate both parties in these matches.
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pj partner. When considering whether to match, the searching partner’s decision is a combination of several
factors. It depends on how frequent the matching opportunities are, and how long the matches are expected
to last. These are represented by λ, the meeting rate and by δ, the rate at which productive matches break
down. The searching partner also needs to take into account the distribution of types of the other partners
looking for a match. Denote by αi the proportion of type pi ’s in the searching pool, and by Ni the number
of that same type in the pool. Hence:
αi = Ni /

n
X

Nj

j=1

Similarly, call γ i the ratio of type pi ’s in the entire economy and by Li their respective number in the economy
or type pi labor force. Hence:
γ i = Li /

n
X

Lj

j=1

The partner searching for an opportunity to produce also has to take into consideration the wages oﬀered in
the market. These are given by cij , the compensation to type pi when matched with type pj . Finally, the
partner must have expectations regarding the matching behavior of others. Denote by Πij the probability
that a representative agent of type pi is willing to match with type pj . Anticipating rational expectations
in the model, this corresponds to type pj ’s beliefs about type pi ’s willingness to match with her. With all
these considerations in mind, a partner of type pi has to choose a probability π ij of accepting to match, upon
meeting type pj . The probability πij is the only decision variable for the partner. Notice that Πij deÞnes
how a representative agent in the market behaves, while πij is the corresponding individual value.

Maximizing behavior by the partners implies that the value of search, in ßow terms, is given by (in steady
state):
∀i ∈ {1...n} , rUi = λ

n
X
k=1

αk Πki M ax {πik (Mik − Ui )}
πik ∈[0,1]

(A)

When calculating her discounted expected value of search, type pi considers the probability of a meeting (at
rate λ per period of time). In case of an encounter, there is a probability αk that the partner met is of type
pk . Type pi believes there is probability Πki that type pk is willing to match with her, in which case, she
then has to decide whether to accept the match or continue search. She accepts to match if her surplus from
6

the match is positive, randomizes if indiﬀerent and rejects it otherwise (if the partner met is not willing to
match, type pi continues to search). Equation (A) accounts for the fact that type pi may encounter any one
of the n types.

When matched with type pj , type pi receives instantaneous compensation cij . Matches break down at a
rate δ per unit of time. Hence:
∀ (i, j) ∈ {1...n} , rMij = cij + δ (Ui − Mij )

(B)

Output is divided between partners, so that:
∀ (i, j) ∈ {1...n} , cij + cji = fij

(C)

The wage negotiated is derived from the Nash bargaining solution (Nash 1950), with disagreement points
equal to the value of search for the respective partners. Hence, partners split the surplus from matching,
where the surplus is deÞned as the value of a match less the value of search. This results in an equal split of
the surplus, since partners have equal bargaining powers. Therefore:
∀ (i, j) ∈ {1...n} , Mij − Ui = Mji − Uj

(D)

The value functions depend on the proportion of the diﬀerent types of partners in the search pool. In
steady state, equality of the ßows in and out of the search pool implies:
∀i ∈ {1...n} , δ [Li − Ni ] = λ(

n
X

αk Πik )Ni

(E)

k=1

The left-hand side of (E) represents the number of type pi partners going back into the search pool (per period
of time). The right-hand side represents the number of type pi leaving that same pool. There are Ni of them
in the search pool and they meet at a rate λ. There is a probability αk that a meeting is with type k and
these encounters lead to matches with a probability Πik .

7

2.3

DeÞnition of a matching equilibrium

DeÞnition A matching equilibrium is comprised of value functions ( Ui , Mij ), compensations ( cij ), skill
distribution of searching partners ( Ni ), individual decision rules ( πij ), beliefs ( Πij ), such that ∀ (i, j) ∈
{1...n}:
i) The value functions correspond to maximizing behaviors by the partners, i.e. they solve the Bellman
equations (A) and (B), with π ij = 1 (∈ [0, 1] , = 0) if Mij − Ui > 0 (= 0, < 0),
ii) Upon matching, the bargaining outcome satisÞes (C) and (D),
iii) The numbers of each type in the search pool satisfy (E),
iv) The beliefs are rational and there is consistency of individual and aggregate behavior, i.e. π ij = Πij .

Remark 1: The focus of this paper is on steady state pure strategy equilibria. Chen (1999) proved existence
of equilibrium, possibly in mixed strategies.

Remark 2: Because of the assumptions on the bargaining outcome, it is always the case that Πij = Πji ,
∀ (i, j) ∈ {1...n}.

3

Characteristics of a matching equilibrium

3.1

General characteristics

Now that a matching equilibrium has been deÞned, it is possible to look at the general properties that all
possible equilibria exhibit. The proofs are given in Appendix A.

Proposition 1 The value of search is strictly increasing in the partners’ type, i.e. i > j =⇒ Ui > Uj .
8

Interpretation: A higher type can always follow the strategy of a lower type and get a higher value from it,
because of higher output when matched. Therefore, the strategy actually chosen by the higher type has to
result in a higher value of search.

Proposition 2 Upon matching, partners do not split output equally, but rather they equally split the output
plus the diﬀerential in their value of search. In other words, ∀ (i, j) ∈ {1...n}, cij =

1
2

[fij + r (Ui − Uj )].

Proposition 3 When matching, the higher productivity partner always retains a strictly bigger share of output, i.e. ∀ (i, j) ∈ {1...n}, if i > j, then cij > cji .
Interpretation: When matching, heterogeneous partners have to split some output. Even though both partners
split the match surplus equally, since the higher productivity partner has a higher value of search, he retains
the larger share of output.

Proposition 4 The compensation that a higher productivity partner receives from matching with a particular
type is strictly larger than the compensation that a lower productivity type receives from matching with that
same type: ∀ (i, j, k) ∈ {1...n}, if i > j, then cik > cjk .
Interpretation: When a higher productivity partner matches with a given type k, not only does the match
produce more output than when a lower productivity partner were to match with that same type k, but
also the higher type has a higher value of search. Hence, the more productive partner receives a bigger
compensation. However, notice that it is not necessarily always the case that cij > cik , when j > k. This is
because, even though more output is produced in the (i, j) match than in the (i, k) match, type j also has a
higher value of search. So, an agent does not always want to match with the most productive type of partners.

Propositions 2-4 are characteristic of models where utility is assumed transferable, such as in the labor
market, where wages are negotiated between workers and Þrms. We know that as long as there is a positive
surplus to a match, the two partners will stop search and accept to match and produce. Because match
payoﬀs are not Þxed, but are determined through negotiations, a partner can always induce the other one
9

to match: as long as the total surplus is positive, both partners can be better oﬀ matched than searching.
Proposition 2 is a direct consequence of the transferable utility assumption. Because more productive types
have higher search values, the less productive ones have to compensate them to accept the match, and hence
the high types must receive more than half the output. Formally, from Proposition 2, the compensation cij
that type i receives from matching with type j is equal to

1
2

[fij + r (Ui − Uj )]3 . It is greater than half the

output if i > j. Propositions 3 and 4 are direct applications from Propositions 1 and 2.

3.2

Conditions for perfect sorting

As established in Burdett and Coles (1997), the non-transferability assumption leads to the creation of
”classes”. As we will see, this result does not necessarily hold with transferable utility. Of all possible
matching patterns, the equilibrium where partners only match with their own types stands out. The following
proposition sets necessary (and sometimes suﬃcient) conditions for within type matching only to be an
equilibrium.

Proposition 5 A necessary condition for an equilibrium, where partners only match with their own type is
that ∀ (i, j) ∈ {1...n} , i 6= j, fii + fjj > 2fij 4 . If λ À r + δ, this condition becomes necessary and suﬃcient5 .

3 Notice

the connection with the wage expression in models such as Pissarides (1990) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).

Assuming equal bargaining power, wage is given by

1
2

[f + rU ], where f is match output and U is the worker’s value of search. In

these models too, wage is a function of output and the diﬀerential in search value between the two parties. In these models, the
Þrm’s search value is always zero, because of the free entry condition. Even if workers were to not receive utility from non-market
production, U would still be strictly greater than zero, because as long as there are Þrms posting vacancies, workers can expect
to enter in a productive match at some point in the future
4 This is the case of strictly supermodular production functions.
5 Notice that the case, where the diﬀerent frictions in the economy disappear, satisÞes λ À r + δ.
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One can see that matching with partners of similar characteristics does not hold generally. This result,
however, extends the Þndings of Becker (1973, 1974). Indeed, when there is no friction in the economy and
the types are complementary inputs in the production function, equilibrium implies assortative matching.
However, when frictions arise, this condition on the types is only necessary for perfect sorting.

For the sake of illustration and to carry some intuition, the next section looks at the simple case, where
there are only two types of agents: high and low productivity.

3.3

An illustration: the two-type-case

In this section, I illustrate the model, by considering the case of two productivity types. The reader will
see that, even in this simple set-up, several matching patterns may arise, including the possibility of multiple
equilibria. However, this will allows us to illustrate some consequences of assuming transferable utility. The
diﬀerent equilibria are denoted in the following manner: the Þrst letter represents who the low productivity
type is willing to match with, and the second letter who the high productivity type is willing to match with.
Partners may match with low types only (L), high types only (H), or both types (B). Given that partners
cannot refuse to match with both types (since there is no income during search) and since, if type pi is willing
to match with type pj , then the reverse is true (from the Nash bargaining assumption), these are the only
possible equilibria:
LH equilibrium if Πll

= Πhh = 1 and Πhl = Πlh = 0

BB equilibrium if Π ll

= Πlh = Πhl = Πhh = 1

HB equilibrium if Πlh

= Πhl = Πhh = 1 and Πll = 0

BL equilibrium if Πll

= Πlh = Πhl = 1 and Πhh = 0

HL equilibrium if Πlh

= Πhl = 1 and Πll = Πhh = 0

It is possible to look graphically at which equilibrium matching patterns emerge for a given production
function. Before, existence conditions have to be derived and an intuitive methodology is provided in Appendix
11

B6 . An example is given in Þgure 1. For that, the skill distribution ({γ l , γ h }), the meeting rate (λ), the
breakdown rate (δ), and the discount rate (r) are Þxed. The regions where a particular equilibrium is
sustainable, are determined in (fhh , fll ) space (the value of flh being Þxed, this restricts the possible values
for fhh and fll ). The dashed line represents the boundary between supermodular and submodular production
functions. For clarity of exposition, the horizontal and vertical axes do not have the same scale. This example
demonstrates the possibility of multiple matching equilibria7 8 . This particular result was also established in
Burdett and Coles (1999) and Sattinger (1995). It is due to the fact that an agent’s matching decision is
a function of the distribution of types in the searching pool, which is the result of the matching decisions
of all other agents. This sorting externality is the source of multiple equilibria. One can observe that,
when the production function is supermodular, only three pure strategy equilibria can arise: LH, BB and
HB (this property can actually be established for all parameterizations). Matches where high types never
match with other high types are precluded in this case. Also, when the partners’ types exhibit a high degree
of complementarity in the production function9 , only LH behavior is sustainable. The counter-intuitive
equilibria where high types refuse to match with each other (BL, HL) correspond to production functions
where fhh is not much higher than flh and fll is low. This can be explained very easily in the context of
transferable utility. Imagine a task, which requires two agents for completion. Assume that two low types
cannot complete the task successfully (i.e. fll ≈ 0), but that two high types together are not much more
productive than a low type and a high type (i.e. fhh ' flh ). For the sake of illustration, one can imagine that

the task is surgery, which requires a surgeon and an assistant to wipe the surgeon’s forehead. Of course, two
medical assistants cannot perform the surgery, but having two surgeons performing the operation does not
produce better results than a surgeon with her assistant. Since assistants are totally unproductive working
together, they have no other option than matching with a surgeon. Under these conditions, a surgeon is well
compensated for accepting a match with an assistant. It may even be preferable for her not to work with
another surgeon, since she would then have to evenly split roughly the same match product, rather than retain
most of it. One can see that this result depends crucially on the transferable utility assumption, whereby a
6 Existence
7 One

conditions are available upon request.
can actually prove that, if γ l = γ h = 12 , then a multiple LH/BB equilibrium cannot exist. This is because these

two matching behaviors would lead to the same skill composition in the search pool, and thus could not both be sustained as
equilibria.
8 It also shows that for some production functions, no pure strategy equilibria are sustainable.
9 i.e. in the right-hand portion of the graph.
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low type can induce a high to match with him, by compensating the high type with a higher wage.

The next section looks at two applications for the model, underscoring the importance of considering
matching patterns between heterogeneous agents in the labor market.

4

Are matching patterns between heterogeneous agents relevant
to the study of labor markets ?

4.1

Unemployment and Wage Dispersion

There has been great interest recently among economists in explaining the diﬀerent labor market outcomes
in the U.S. and in Europe, as witnessed by the abundant literature (Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bertola and
Ichino (1995), Bertola and Rogerson (1997), Lazear (1990), Millard and Mortensen (1997), Mortensen and
Pissarides (1999) just to name a few). It is observed that European countries experience higher unemployment
than the U.S. and exhibit lower wage dispersion. The explanations put forward all rely on having diﬀerent
labor market policies in Europe and the U.S. To the exception of Bertola and Ichino (1995), however, the
focus of these papers is only on one aspect of the divergence between American and European labor markets,
namely unemployment diﬀerences. While these types of explanations have deÞnite merits, it is possible, using
the model, to take a diﬀerent approach and investigate whether matching patterns between heterogeneous
agents can simultaneously explain both the unemployment and wage dispersion diﬀerences across markets. In
particular, it is often taken as given, without much rationalization, that wage setting institutions in Europe
result in more compressed wages. I want to propose an explanation that does not posit wage compression to
induce high unemployment, but rather one where the two phenomena naturally arise together, i.e. I want to
propose a rationale for endogenous wage compression10 .
10 Notice

that a legally imposed minimum wage may also generate higher unemployment and lower wage dispersion in the

context of this model, by precluding the formation of some matches (either by preventing matches between two low productivity
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Figure 1: Equilibrium regions: γ h = 1/3, λ = 1, δ = .1, r = .02, flh = 1
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This model also contributes to the literature on wage inequality. Kremer and Maskin (1996) and Krusell,
Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000) look at the eﬀects of a skill-biased technological change on wage
dispersion. However, because they look at competitive economies, their models do not have implications on
unemployment. Acemoglu (1999) and Albrecht and Vroman (2000) build models where the labor market is
characterized by search frictions. They have ex-ante heterogeneity in workers (high- or low-skill), but their
set-ups diﬀer from mine, since they assume that Þrms endogenously post vacancies. Although their models
diﬀer along several dimensions, they both Þnd that equilibria with endogenous segmentation along worker
skill lines result in both higher wage dispersion and unemployment than equilibria where high- and low-skill
workers may accept the same type of jobs11 . While that literature focuses primarily on accounting for the
recent trend in wage inequality in the U.S., the present model is interested in explaining the diﬀerences in
wage inequality and unemployment in the U.S. and Europe.

The model is able to determine equilibrium values for unemployment and wages. Of course, diﬀerent types
of equilibria result in distinct steady state values. Therefore, matching patterns inßuence the proportion of
workers looking for a job, as well as the wage distribution. The measure of wage inequality retained is the
ratio of highest wage observed to lowest wage observed. This is similar to the ratio of ith percentile to jth
percentile often used in the literature. I retain this particular measure among others, since it Þts the theoretical
framework quite well. Hence, it is possible, using the model, to consider the possibility that Europe and the
U.S. are in diﬀerent equilibria, with the US. being in a low employment/high wage dispersion equilibrium and
Europe being in a high unemployment/low wage dispersion equilibrium.

partners or by restricting a low productivity type from transferring enough utility to a high productivity partner to induce her to
match). However, there is evidence showing that there is smaller wage dispersion within type in Europe, even after controlling
for the usual skill proxies (education, experience). A minimum wage can not explain smaller wage dispersion at high skill levels in
Europe. Therefore, I do not pursue an explanation in this direction, but rather attempt to provide an explanation for endogenous
wage compression.
11 Because these authors have diﬀerent assumptions, they also have diﬀerent matching patterns in their respective other possible
non-segmented equilibrium. Acemoglu’s assumptions imply that all jobs are of the same type and attract high- and low-skill
workers. Albrecht and Vroman’s assumptions imply that there are two types of jobs and that high-skill workers accept to work
both for high and low productivity Þrms, while low-skill workers only match with low productivity Þrms.

15

As we have seen in section 3.3, distinct matching patterns may be either due to diﬀerent fundamental
parameters or to diﬀerent beliefs. Since it is known that breakdown rates, for example, have diﬀerent values
in Europe and in the U.S., I will emphasize the Þrst approach. Because the labor market policies in place
aﬀect some of these parameters (in particular meeting or breakdown rates), this methodology will generate
a link between policies and matching patterns. Hence, the exercise is to see how parameter values inßuence
equilibrium matching between heterogeneous agents. I will Þrst present simulations outlining which sets of
parameter values give rise to particular equilibria. This will be done by varying the meeting and breakdown
rates, which may be inßuenced by labor market policies, and leaving the other parameters constant (skill
distribution, technology and rate of time preference). Then, I will present some evidence that, in line with the
respective policies in place, actual match breakdown rates are consistent with individual European workers
matching in equilibrium with a limited set of productivity types, and American workers with a larger set
of types. In other words, the characteristics of the American and European labor markets lead to more
homogeneity within European matches than within American ones. Using the literature on under- and overeducation, I will also provide direct additional evidence showing that, indeed, European labor market matches
tend to be more homogeneous. After establishing that the two economies are distinguished by diﬀerent
matching patterns, I will provide some intuition, based on the transferable utility assumption, why these
patterns lead to the unemployments/wage dispersions actually observed. Finally, I will also present some
theoretical support that more heterogeneity in matches lead to lower unemployment together with higher
wage dispersion.

4.1.1

Are the U.S. and Europe characterized by diﬀerent matching patterns?

The model is simulated to determine the parameter regions compatible with particular equilibria. To that
eﬀect, the technology parameters (f), the skill distribution (γ i , i = 1...n) and the rate of time preference (r)
are Þxed, while the meeting and breakdown rates (λ, δ) are allowed to vary. For clarity of exposition, I again
assume that partners are of two types (low and high productivity). From Proposition 5, we know that the
production function has to be supermodular to possibly generate LH equilibria. Since the simulation results
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do not qualitatively depend on the production function assumed12 , fll , flh and fhh are set at 0.3, 0.5 and 0.9,
respectively. The discount rate r is set at 0.02, which corresponds to a real interest rate of 2% per quarter13 .
Finally, I chose γ h = 1/3 (implying that there are twice as many low-skilled than high skilled workers). In
the picture, λ ∈ [0, 6], which implies that the average time before a meeting takes place is greater than two
weeks and δ ∈ [0, 1], which is equivalent to assuming that the average employment duration is at least one
quarter. The equilibrium region graph is shown in Þgure 2.

Figure 2: Equilibrium regions: γ h = 1/3, r = 0.02, (fll , flh , fhh ) = (.3, .5, .9)

LH equilibria are consistent with higher values of λ/δ, while BB equilibria are associated with lower such
ratios. These results are intuitive, since a high meeting rate or a low breakdown rate justify high types being
patient and waiting to meet other high types. Under such parameters, a low type cannot compensate a high
12 All

the production functions simulated returned an equilibrium region graph similar to the one presented below, with LH, BB

and multiple equilibria (LH/BB) regions. The only way to have HB as an equilibrium is to choose f such that fhh + fll & 2flh
(but not too close) and γ h ≥ 12 . In that case, Þxing λ and increasing δ, one would move from an LH to an HB to a BB region.
13 The discount rate turns out to be the least sensitive of all parameters in determining the equilibrium regions.
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type enough to accept to match with him. In other words, matching with the Þrst partner occurs when it is
not justiÞed to wait for a better match (in the same spirit, and using unreported simulations, LH equilibria
are associated with large proportions of high-skilled workers and low discount rates).

The empirical evidence supports the notion that match breakdowns are more frequent in the U.S. than in
Europe. For example, Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) report that European unemployment is characterized
by longer, but less frequent spells than in the U.S. These authors Þnd that only 10% of the unemployed have
been in that state for above a year in the U.S., while the same number is between 40% and 50% in Europe. At
the same time, the inßow rates into unemployment are two to eight times higher in the U.S. than in Europe14 .
Further evidence from the OECD Job Study (1994) shows that the average job tenure is greater in Europe,
while the percentage of tenure of less than one year is greater in the U.S. All of this indicates that matches
break down at a lower rate in Europe than in the U.S., which according to the model, promotes within type
matching15 . Finally, notice that these results are consistent with all the theoretical literature (Bentolila and
Bertola (1990), Bertola (1990), Delacroix (1998), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Millard and Mortensen
(1997) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)), which Þnds that higher Þring costs, such as those observed in
Europe, lead to lower rates of job separation.

In addition to Þnding that employment stability in Europe promotes within-type matching, one can Þnd
direct evidence about matching patterns in the respective economies. In order to do that, one can look at
the extent of under- and over-education in various labor markets. One can do this by comparing the level
of education required for a particular job with the education actually completed by the worker holding that
position. Following Hartog (2000), required schooling is typically measured in three diﬀerent ways. The Þrst
method uses Job Analysis (JA) data. This involves the evaluation of the required level and type of education
14 As

measured by the number of unemployed for less than a month as a percent of the population aged 15-64 less the unemployed

(target population).
15 Using microeconomic evidence from the OECD Employment Outlook (1994), Bertola and Rogerson (1997) Þnd that job
destruction rates (job destruction as a percentage of total employment) are of the same order of magnitude in Europe and the
U.S. While this data cannot be easily reconciled with the evidence presented above, note that Bertola and Rogerson mention
that there may be some measurement issues associated with their evidence (diﬀerences in data collection, compositional eﬀects).
And the evidence on worker turnover, as opposed to job turnover, is in line with what is reported in the text.
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for the job titles in an occupational classiÞcation, by professional job analysts16 . The second method, uses
Worker Self-Assessment (WA) data, which consists of the worker specifying the education required for the job.
This can be done using PSID data, as in Sicherman (1991). Finally, the information can be obtained from
realized matches (RM), where the required education is derived from what workers usually have attained, i.e.
the mean or the mode of that distribution. Using one of these methodologies, it is possible to measure the
incidence of (i) matches where workers are over-educated, (ii) matches where workers are under-educated and
(iii) proper matches, i.e. where workers have the correct education level for the job.

The data presented comes from Hartog (2000) for the Netherlands, Portugal and the U.K., from Daly,
Büchel and Duncan (2000) for Germany, and from Acemoglu (1999) for the United States. Hartog (2000)
also provide results identical to Acemoglu (1999) for the U.S. The method used is WA for Germany, the
Netherlands, the U.K. and the U.S., and JA for Portugal. This choice is due to the availability of the
data. However, when both methodologies were available, WA and JA provided similar results. Additional
information in Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988) and Sicherman (1991) conÞrms the patterns observed in the U.S.
and the Netherlands, for slightly diﬀerent periods. In the U.S., Sicherman (1991) reports that in a sample of
about 5,000 male households aged 18-60, when asked ”how much formal education is required to get a job like
yours?”, and when compared to the respondents’ actual completed education level, 57% of the sample reported
either under-education or over-education. This study was conducted using PSID data from 1976 and 1978
(Acemoglu (1999) conducted the same study for 1985 and still found that 54% of the individuals sampled
reported that their own education level was diﬀerent than the one required). For purpose of comparison,
Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988) Þnd that incidence of over- or under-education is more common in the U.S.
than in Netherlands.

Figure 3 reports the proportion of proper matches, unemployment rate, and wage dispersion (measured
as the log-diﬀerence between the 90th and the 10th percentile of the wage distribution) for the Þve countries,
in particular years. The limited availability of data on proper matches dictated the choice of country and
years reported. However, all the data falls in a relatively short time period (1981-86). Portugal was the
only country for which data was available for several years between 1981 and 1986, and it exhibited roughly
16 One

such example is the United States Dictionary of Occupational Titles (USDOT).
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Cross-country comparison
(% of proper matches in parentheses)
12%
U.K. '86
(52%)

Unemployment rate

11%
Netherlands '82
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10%

9%

Portugal '85
(30%)

8%
Germany '84
(75%)

7%

U.S. '86
(46%)

6%
0.9

1

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

Wage dispersion 90/10

Figure 3:
constant incidence of proper matches. The data on wage dispersion comes from the OECD Employment
Outlook (1996) and the unemployment rate data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics database. Figure
4 reports average unemployment and wage dispersion between 1981 and 1986 for the same countries (not
enough data was available to compute the average incidence of proper matches over the same period).

This evidence is compatible with the notion that partners match with a larger set of productivity types,
or a greater percentage of the population, in the U.S. than in Europe.

The latter has a higher incidence

of proper matches, i.e. a higher proportion of matches with the required productivity type. In the U.S.,
however, matches tend to show more heterogeneity. This claim can also be supported by other considerations.
Since European countries are characterized by more generous and longer unemployment beneÞts, this enables
workers looking for a job to be more picky when choosing whether to agree to match with a given type or to
wait for a better match17 . Assuming diﬀerent matching patterns across the ocean also Þts the fact that higher
unemployment is observed in Europe for all skill categories (and therefore is not only due to labor market
17 Also,

the prevalence of advance notice for high skill workers in Europe may increase the proportion of matches between high

types at the expense of matches with low types.
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Cross-country comparison: '81-'86
(% of proper matches in parentheses)
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1.0
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1.3

1.4

Wage dispersion 90/10

Figure 4:
policies aﬀecting primarily the lesser skilled workers). It also implies that the duration of unemployment is
higher in Europe than in the U.S., as observed empirically.

In conclusion, Þgures 3 and 4 show that countries with a high incidence of proper matches tend to exhibit
both high unemployment and low wage dispersion, as expected when partners’ heterogeneity is taken into
account. The Netherlands, Portugal, the U.K. and the U.S. Þt that description exactly. Germany, which
has the highest proportion of proper matches, also has the lowest wage dispersion. However, it exhibits
relatively low unemployment. This was pointed out in Nickell and Bell (1996), who underline the speciÞcity
of the German educational system. In Germany, two-thirds of the teenagers participate in an apprenticeship
training system. Apprentices receive both classroom and on-the-job training. This can be expected to promote
the formation of matches between an apprentice and her Þrm, and therefore to reduce unemployment.
In the next section, I provide some intuition why the matching patterns observed in the U.S. and Europe
simultaneously generate the correct unemployment and wage dispersion patterns and give a theoretical result
showing that heterogeneity in matches is associated with lower unemployment and higher wage dispersion,
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under transferable utility.

4.1.2

How do matching patterns aﬀect unemployment and wage dispersion?

We know that Europe18 is in an equilibrium where every category of workers matches with a limited set of
other productivity types, while, in the U.S., workers match with a larger set of partners. What does this imply
for unemployment and wage dispersion? In an economy, like the U.S, where agents match with productivity
types very diﬀerent from theirs, this results in more matches for all types, and hence lower unemployment.
In that economy, a high productivity type may accept to match with a lower type. However, there is an
opportunity cost to the high type of matching with a low type. Hence, in the bargaining, the low type
needs to compensate the high type to induce him to match. We know that, due to the transferable utility
assumption, wages split output plus the diﬀerential in search values. When agents match with a larger set of
types, this diﬀerential can become large in matches between agents that are quite diﬀerent in productivity.
Hence, one observes higher wage dispersion, because low types had to compensate higher types more for
accepting to match. This is similar, in spirit, to the ”opportunity cost eﬀect” mentioned in Acemoglu (1997).
These considerations can even explain higher within-type wage dispersion19 in the U.S., as reported in Bertola
and Ichino (1995).

One can again simulate the model to verify that unemployment is higher and wage dispersion lower in an
economy with homogenous matches only (LH equilibrium), than in an economy with heterogeneous matches
(BB equilibrium). Keeping the same values for f , γ h and r and Þxing λ = 6 (i.e. an average of two weeks
between meetings), one can allow the breakdown rate to vary. Starting from δ = 0 and increasing its value,
the equilibrium changes from LH to BB, as in Þgure 5. One can check that, as long as δ Europe < δ U.S. are
not too far apart, but yet generate diﬀerent matching patterns, the resulting unemployment rate in Europe
18 Among

the countries for which we had relevant evidence, European workers match with a smaller set of types than their

American counterparts, to the exception of Portugal. However, Portugal still Þts very well in our framework, since it had (in the
early 80’s) relatively low unemployment, and at the same time, high wage dispersion.
19 i.e. wage dispersion for workers of identical characteristics.
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(U %(LH)) is greater than the unemployment rate in the U.S. (U %(BB))20 . One can in fact notice that, as
δ increases and the equilibrium type changes, there is a sudden drop in the unemployment rate.

Figure 5: Unemployment and wage dispersion: γ h = 1/3, r = 0.02, (fll , flh , fhh ) = (.3, .5, .9) , λ = 6

One can also use the model to look for theoretical support for the claim that the unemployment and wage
dispersion observed in Europe and the U.S. are consequences of diﬀerent matching patterns. Proposition
6 looks at the issue of within-type wage dispersion and establishes that, when a given type’s unconditional
probability of matching is higher in a particular equilibrium matching pattern, then the lower bound on wage
dispersion for this type of partners is higher in that equilibrium. If all types tend to match with larger
matching sets, then greater within-type wage dispersion leads to greater overall wage dispersion.

DeÞne the within-type wage dispersion W Di for type pi , as the ratio of the highest to the lowest wage
observed for that type in equilibrium. Also deÞne type pi ’s unconditional probability of matching Pbi , as the

product of the meeting rate λ times the proportion of the population type pi is willing to match with (Pbi =
n
P
αk Πik ).
λ
k=1

20 Of

course, when δ is very low (and matches extremely stable), an LH equilibrium may result in very low unemployment.

Similarly, if δ is very high (and matches do not last long at all), then a BB equilibrium may result in very high unemployment.
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Proposition 6 For a given type pi , when the unconditional probability of matching Pbi increases from one

equilibrium to another, then the lower bound on the wage dispersion for type pi also increases. The lower
bound is given by: W Di º

bi
P
bi .
r+δ+P

When types pi match with a great variety of other types, some of the matches will be with partners very
diﬀerent from them, which implies that they will be either well compensated to accept the match or that they
will have to accept low wages themselves. This will tend to increase W Di . And of course, when Pbi is high, a
higher proportion of meetings lead to matches and thus unemployment is lower.

4.2

Noise in wages

Another point can be made to further emphasize the importance of studying the matching patterns of
heterogeneous agents in the labor market. Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis and Troske (1998) showed, using
individual data on wages, matched with Þrm data, that the combination of observed and unobserved individual
characteristics and establishment eﬀects, explain more of the French wage data than the American one. In
other terms, there is more noise in the U.S. than in the French wage data.

From Proposition 2, we know that, for given productivity types pi and pj , the wage cij is not only a
function of the productive characteristics of the two partners engaged in the match (fij ), but also of their
respective values of search, Ui and Uj . In equilibrium, type pi optimally matches with a certain set of types.
These matching opportunities aﬀect her value of search, and hence the wage she can negotiate with type pj .
In conclusion, the wage cij depends on more than just fij . Because the values of search Ui and Uj reßect all
the matching opportunities that pi and pj have in equilibrium, besides just matching with each other, cij also
depends on the characteristics of members of type pi ’s and pj ’s matching sets (and even on which types the
latter are matching with, and so on)21 .
21 Denote

by Ξi , type pi ’s matching set. We know that cij depends on fij , Ui and Uj . It is established in Appendix A that
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Applying this reasoning to Europe and the U.S., one can expect more noise in wage data in the U.S.,
after controlling for the partners’ characteristics: if partners match with larger sets in the U.S., then the
characteristics of the match participants are less relevant in the wage determination. We know from Abowd,
Kramarz, Margolis and Troske (1998) that this is indeed the case.

5

Conclusion and future extensions

An equilibrium model was developed where agents of diﬀerent productivities have to decide which kind
of partners to match with, when frictions make Þnding a partner a diﬃcult and time consuming process.
The model was designed to replicate the salient features of a labor market. In equilibrium, several matching
patterns may arise, as illustrated in the two-type case. General characteristics of a matching equilibrium were
underlined, emphasizing the importance of assuming transferable utility. The model was then applied to the
issues of (i) wage dispersion and unemployment in Europe and the U.S. and of (ii) the relationship between
wage and Þrms’ and workers’ characteristics in France and the U.S. It was shown that matching patterns
may explain the diﬀerences between these labor markets. In fact, the model emphasized the need for more
cross-country empirical research on matching behavior between agents of diﬀerent productivities.

A natural extension of this framework would be to directly introduce labor market policies, such as
unemployment insurance, Þring costs or minimum wages, into the model and see how they aﬀect matching
patterns. One would then better be able to analyze how a skill-biased technological change might interact with
labor policies to induce changes in unemployment and wage dispersion in the U.S. and Europe, as observed
since the 1980’s. In addition to wage dispersion, the diﬀerence in earnings mobility between the two labor
markets could also be examined with such matching considerations.
λ

Ui =

Ã

P

k∈Ξi

r r+δ+λ

αk cik
P

k∈Ξi

αk

!

. Hence, Ui depends on all the wages type pi can expect to receive with partners in his matching set.

As cik , in turn, depends on fik , Ui and Uk , we can see that cij is a function of fij , fik , Uk (k ∈ Ξi ), but also fjl , Ul (l ∈ Ξj ).
This is not all cij depends on, though. One can notice, by iteration, that cij also depends on fkm (m ∈ Ξk ) and flp (p ∈ Ξl ) ...
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A

Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1:
Let us call Ξi , type i’s matching set. By deÞnition, Ξi = {j, Mij ≥ Ui }. In equilibrium,∀i ∈ {1...n} ,
P
αk (Mik − Ui ) and ∀ (i, j) ∈ {1...n} , rMij = cij + δ (Ui − Mij ). Hence, (B) implies that:
rUi = λ
k∈Ξi
P
λ
(r + δ) (Mij − Ui ) = cij − rUi . Then (A) implies that: rUi = r+δ
αk (cik − rUi ). Since the surplus is split
k∈Ξi

equally between matching partners, cij −rUi = cji −rUj = fij −cij −rUj . Hence, cij =
28

1
2

[fij + rUi − rUj ] and

cij − rUi =

1
2

[fij − rUi − rUj ]. Therefore, rUi =

λ
2(r+δ)

P

k∈Ξi

αk (fik − rUi − rUk ). It is clear that (Mij − Ui ),

cij − rUi , and fij − rUi − rUj have the same sign, so that j ∈ Ξi ⇔ fij − rUi − rUj ≥ 0.
P
λ
αk (fik − rUi − rUk ).
Let us now show that for any type and any subset S of {1...n}, rUi ≥ 2(r+δ)
k∈S
P
λ
αk (fik − rUi − rUk ) (H).
Suppose that: ∃i ∈ {1...n} , ∃S ⊂ {1...n} , rUi < 2(r+δ)
k∈S
P
P
αk (fik − rUi − rUk ) <
αk (fik − rUi − rUk ). If Ξi \S ∩ Ξi = ∅, then Ξi ⊂ S. But this would
Then,
k∈Ξi

k∈S

be in contradiction with (H), since for every k ∈ S\Ξi , fik − rUi − rUk < 0. If S\S ∩ Ξi = ∅, then S ⊂ Ξi .
But this would also be in contradiction with (H).
P
P
αk (fik − rUi − rUk ) <
Therefore,
k∈Ξi \S∩Ξi

k∈S\S∩Ξi

αk (fik − rUi − rUk ). However, by deÞnition of Ξi , the

left-hand side term is non-negative while the right-hand side term is negative, leading to a contradiction.
P
λ
αk (fik − rUi − rUk ).
Hence, ∀i ∈ {1...n} , ∀S ⊂ {1...n} , rUi ≥ 2(r+δ)
k∈S
P
λ
αk (fik − rUi − rUk ).
Now, take (i, j) ∈ {1...n} , i > j, rUi ≥ 2(r+δ)
k∈Ξj
P
λ
αk (fik − fjk − rUi + rUj )
Hence, rUi − rUj ≥ 2(r+δ)
k∈Ξj
Ã
!
P
P
λ
λ
αk ≥ 2(r+δ)
αk (fik − fjk ) > 0. This implies that Ui > Uj .
and r (Ui − Uj ) 1 + 2(r+δ)
k∈Ξj

k∈Ξj

Proof of Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 was established in the proof of proposition 1.

Proof of Proposition 3:
From equilibrium condition (D), Ui − Uj = Mij − Mji . From equilibrium condition (B), rMij = cij +
δ (Ui − Mij ) and rMji = cji + δ (Uj − Mji ). Hence, cij − cji = r (Mij − Mji ) = r (Ui − Uj ). From Proposition
1, if i > j, then Ui > Uj , and therefore cij > cji .

Proof of Proposition 4:
Using Proposition 2, cik =

1
2

[fik + rUi − rUk ]. Hence, cik − cjk =

i > j, fik > fjk and Ui > Uj , then cik > cjk .
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1
2

[fik − fjk + r (Ui − Uj )]. Since, when

Proof of Proposition 5:
From (A) and (B), rUi = λ

P

k∈Ξi

αk (Mik − Ui ) and rMij = cij + δ (Ui − Mij ), where αk is the proportion of

set. After calculations:
type k partners in the searching pool and Ξi isÃtype i’s matching
!
λ

∀ (i, j) , Ui =

Ã

P

αk cik

r r+δ+λ

k∈Ξi

r r+δ+λ

P

αk

k∈Ξi

!

P

and Mij =

Ã

r(r+δ) r+δ+λ

Looking for an equilibrium where Ξi = {i},
∀i, Ui =

αk cij +λδ

k∈Ξi

P

k∈Ξi

P

k∈Ξi

αk

!

αk cik

.

λαi 12 fii
r(r+δ+λαi )

1
2 fii
(r+δ+λαi ) > 0
(r+δ+λαi )cij −λαi 12 fii
i, Mij − Ui =
(r+δ)(r+δ+λαi )

∀i, Mii − Ui =
∀j 6=

For ”perfect sorting” under frictions, it is necessary that: ∀ (i, j) , i 6= j, (r + δ + λαi ) cij < λαi 12 fii . From
h
i
λαi 21 fii
λαj 21 fjj
−
Proposition 2, cij = 12 [fij + rUi − rUj ] = 12 fij + (r+δ+λα
(r+δ+λαj ) . Hence, we need: ∀ (i, j) , i 6= j,
i)
h
i
1
1
λα
f
λα
f
i 2 ii
j 2 jj
(r + δ + λαi ) 12 fij + (r+δ+λα
− (r+δ+λα
< λαi 21 fii
i)
j)
(r+δ+λαi )
⇒ 12 fij (r + δ + λαi ) − 14 λαi fii − 14 λαj fjj (r+δ+λα
<0
j)

After a little algebra
⇒ (2fij − fii − fjj ) (r + δ + λαi ) (r + δ + λαj ) + fii (r + δ) (r + δ + λαj ) + fjj (r + δ + λαi ) (r + δ) < 0.
So, if ∃ (i, j) , i 6= j, such that 2fij ≥ fii + fjj , then the equilibrium would not be supported. Hence,
2fij < fii + fjj , ∀ (i, j) , i 6= j, is a necessary condition for such an equilibrium to exist. If λ À r + δ, then the
above inequality becomes: (2fij − fii − fjj ) λ2 αi αj < 0. Then, strict supermodularity of f is a necessary and

suﬃcient condition for such an equilibrium to exist.

Proof of Proposition 6:
From the expressions for Mij and Ui established in the proof of Proposition 5, we know that: j ∈ Ξi ⇔
³
´
P
P
≥
−
1
αk (cik − cij ) ⇔ (r+δ)
αk ccik
(r + δ) cij ≥ λ
. In particular, calling ci,min and ci,max , the
λ
ij
k∈Ξi

k∈Ξi

smallest and biggest of the compensations in type pi ’s matching set, respectively (i.e. smallest and biggest
³
´
P
P
cik
≥
−
1
=⇒ (r+δ)
α
+
αk ≥
of compensations observed for type pi ), we have that: (r+δ)
k
λ
ci,max
λ
k∈Ξi
k∈Ξi
P
P
i,min
cik
≥ cci,max
αk ci,max
αk . Now, if I deÞne wage dispersion for type pi , W Di , as W Di = cci,max
, then, we
i,min
k∈Ξi

have that: W Di ≥

k∈Ξi
1
P
1+ λ r+δ
α
k∈Ξi

. The right-hand side term is a lower bound for type pi ’s wage dispersion.

k

As an equilibrium is characterized by matching sets {Ξi }i=1...n and distribution of types in the searching
30

pool{αj }j=1...n , we can compare lower bounds for wage dispersion in diﬀerent equilibria. Hence, if, for a given
P
αk ) increases from one equilibrium to the other, then the lower
type pi , the probability of matching (λ
k∈Ξi

bound also increases.

B

Determination of the existence conditions

There are two ways to obtain the existence conditions. One can take each possible equilibrium in turn, and
solve the system of equations (A)-(E), given the corresponding values for Πij . This involves long calculations
and little intuition. Alternatively, one can proceeds as follows. First consider the decision problem of an agent
facing meeting opportunities at a rate λ, of which a proportion α pay a wage w1 and a proportion (1 − α) pay
a wage w2 (the resulting matches break down at a rate δ). At this point α, w1 and w2 are exogenous. It is
easy to compute the value of search U , as well as the values of a match at wage w1 , M1 and at wage w2 , M2 .
Knowing these values, the decision problem is trivial. Whether the agent accepts matches at w1 and at w2 is
determined by inequalities between r, δ, λ, α, w1 and w2 . Consider that this is the problem faced by a high
productivity type. Now consider the same problem faced by another agent, the low productivity type, except
that a proportion α of the wages oﬀered pay w10 and a proportion (1 − α) pay a wage w20 . Again, the values
of search and of a match U 0 , M10 and M20 can be calculated. The low types’ decision problem is determined
by inequalities between r, δ, λ, α, w10 and w20 . Let α be the proportion of high types in the searching pool.
Thus, as per the model notations, w1 = chh , w2 = chl , w10 = clh , w20 = cll , U = Uh , M1 = Mhh and so on. The
model can be closed by noticing that (i) due to the nature of the bargaining solution retained, the surplus is
equally split between agents, (ii) the sum of the compensations within a given match is equal to the output
produced, and (iii) α can be calculated separately for each possible equilibrium considered. Calculations are
available upon request. Once the value functions are determined, one can obtain the existence conditions by
checking when the match surpluses are consistent with the partners’ matching decisions.
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